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limit its application. Bryson's plan did not satisfy those principles, and,
therefore, the court ruled the exception inapplicable. Although the Fourth
Circuit failed to conclusively decide the fate of the new capital exception,
it determined that fairness and equity control the exception as well as the
absolute priority rule. Therefore, if the absolute priority rule includes the
exception, it does so in only narrow circumstances.
C. CIVIL RIGHTS
Proud v. Stone
945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991)
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 62 (ADEA) prohibits em-
ployers from engaging in any unfair treatment of employees on the basis
of their age. In Fink v. Western Electric Co.,63 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit set forth the three elements necessary
to establish a prima facie case under the ADEA: (1) that the plaintiff is
a member of the group that the ADEA protects; (2) that the plaintiff has
suffered adverse treatment by an employer; and (3) that age was a
motivating factor in the employer's action. 4 In Conkwright v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.,65 moreover, the Fourth Circuit adopted for use in
ADEA cases the same scheme for burden of proof that the Supreme Court
established for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green."
The Conkwright court held that once the plaintiff presents a prima facie
case of age discrimination, the burden is on the defendant to show a
nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken. Once the defendant meets
that burden, the plaintiff must then show that the defendant's stated
reason was pretextual. 67
In most ADEA cases, the difficult, and usually the only, issue is the
existence of discriminatory animus on the part of the employer. 6 The
resolution of this issue often requires the parties to proceed through the
entire proof scheme at trial. Even in a seemingly frivolous ADEA claim,
an employer may be subject to a costly ADEA action as the employer
attempts to justify its actions.6 9 One recurrent situation often giving rise
to an insubstantial ADEA claim is when an employer hires an individual
and discharges that individual within a short time.
70
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633 (1988).
63. 708 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1983).
64. Fink v. Western Elec. Co., 708 F.2d 909, 914 (4th Cir. 1983).
65. 933 F.2d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1991).
66. 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973).
67. Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1991).
68. Fink, 708 F.2d at 914.
69. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991).
70. Id. at 796.
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In Proud v. Stone, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered whether the discharge of an employee by the same
individual who had hired him less than six months earlier was the result
of illegal age discrimination. In Proud, the plaintiff, Warren Proud,
applied for a position as Chief Accountant in the Army's Central Ac-
counting Division. Klauss, the Central Accounting Officer, considered
Proud along with six other applicants for the position. While Proud, at
68 years of age, was the oldest of the seven applicants, Klauss selected
Proud because of his superior qualifications in terms of education and
experience. Shortly after Proud took his position, Klauss detected numer-
ous deficiencies in Proud's job performance. Klauss held two separate
counselling sessions with Proud and, after observing no improvement in
his performance, Klauss requested Proud's dismissal.
Proud filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia alleging that his discharge violated the ADEA. The district court
thereafter granted the Army's motion to move the case to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Virginia
District Court dismissed the suit at the close of the plaintiff's evidence
because of insufficient evidence to support a cause of action.
Proud appealed offering several contentions in support of his ADEA
claim including, inter alia, that his supervisors provided him with inade-
quate training and guidance, that the work for which his supervisors
criticized him was standard practice, and that his employer did not
discharge younger, similarly-situated employees who committed the same
errors. The Fourth Circuit, however, declined to address each of the
plaintiff's contentions. Rather, the court focused on whether the plaintiff
had established a prima facie case of age discrimination by proving that
his age was a motivating factor in his employer's termination decision.
In examining whether Proud established his prima facie case, the
Fourth Circuit focused on the fact that the same individual, Klauss, was
both the hirer and the firer and the fact that the duration of employment
lasted a relatively short time. The Fourth Circuit held that there is a
strong presumption that age discrimination is not a motivating factor in
an employer's decision when the employer hires an individual with full
knowledge of that individual's age and, within a relatively short time,
fires that same individual. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that it would be
senseless for an employer to hire employees from an age group that the
employer dislikes, only to dismiss the employees once they have taken
their position. While the Fourth Circuit recognized that there may be
instances where discriminatory motivation could still be proven under these
circumstances, the strong inference likely would allow the resolution of
most cases at an early stage.
The Fourth Circuit applied this presumption of nondiscrimination to
the facts in Proud and concluded that because Klauss hired Proud with
full knowledge of Proud's age and, within a short time period, fired
Proud for legitimate reasons, the facts clearly gave rise to the inference
of nondiscrimination. The Fourth Circuit therefore held that Proud failed
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to present evidence sufficient to overcome this strong inference and,
accordingly, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim.
The Fourth Circuit then proceeded to reconcile its holding with the
McDonnell proof scheme. The Fourth Circuit noted that the purpose of
the proof scheme is to assist judges by setting forth the key issues and
the respective burdens of proof in an ADEA case. While the proof scheme
is unnecessary to resolve the issue of discrimination in cases where the
hirer and firer are the same individual, the result of the inference is the
same when courts use the proof scheme. When an employer hires and,
within a short time, fires the employee, there is a strong inference that
the employer's proffered reason for the termination is not pretextual. The
plaintiff generally will be unable to present sufficient evidence to overcome
the strong presumption of nondiscrimination.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit discussed its holding in light of the purposes
of the ADEA. The Fourth Circuit observed that if courts allowed ADEA
plaintiffs to proceed to trial under these circumstances, the courts would
subject employers to the possibility of a costly ADEA suit in any termi-
nation of an older employee, even where there are legitimate reasons for
dismissal. Ultimately employers may simply refuse to hire older workers
to avoid liability. The Fourth Circuit noted that the presumption of
nondiscriminatory intent would further the aims of the ADEA by providing
for an early resolution of insubstantial claims.
The Proud court essentially refined the ADEA analysis to provide for
an early resolution of those cases in which the hirer and firer are the same
individual and the time span involved is relatively brief. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressly adopted the Proud
presumption of nondiscrimination in a similar case in which the employer
dismissed the plaintiff within two years of hiring him.7' Because the Proud
presumption of nondiscrimination logically flows from these facts, and
because the presumption does not conflict with the McDonnell scheme of
proof, other circuits likely will follow the Eighth Circuit in adopting the
Proud presumption.
Gordon v. Kidd
971 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1992)
An incarcerated person, whether serving a sentence or awaiting a trial,
has a clearly established right to medical attention.72 Jail officials violate
71. Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1992).
72. Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 164-65 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds,
490 U.S. 296 (1989). In the case of a convicted prisoner, deliberate indifference to his medical
needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the prisoner's Eighth Amendment
rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977). Jailers
owe at least the same level of care to a person awaiting trial, because, although Eighth Amendment
protections do not apply to a pretrial detainee, that person's due process rights are at least as
great as a convicted prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983); Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 405 (7thCir. 1992).
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that right if they are deliberately indifferent to an inmate's medical needs, 73
including any serious psychological impairment. 74 The duty of state offi-
cials to refrain from deliberate indifference includes a responsibility to
protect an inmate from self-destruction or self-injury.7 5 Jail officials do
not fall short of this duty by mere negligence,7 6 and simply failing to
prevent a suicide does not constitute deliberate indifference. 77 Rather, the
test for deliberate indifference in a jail-suicide case is whether jail officials
actually knew, or reasonably should have known, of a particular inmate's
suicidal tendencies. 78 Applying this standard in Gordon v. Kidd,79 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a district
court's denial of summary judgment to a jail official on the issue of
deliberate indifference.
On June 17, 1988, Elise Gordon called 911 from her home. She told
a dispatcher that her husband, Clarence Gordon, was carrying a knife in
his hand, was "sloppy drunk," and was threatening to kill himself.8 0 Two
Charlotte, North Carolina police officers responded to the call and entered
the Gordon home, where Clarence approached them with his knife. The
officers ordered Clarence to drop the knife. When he did, the police
arrested Clarence on an assault charge. After the police took Clarence
into their custody, Elise asked one of the officers whether her husband
could be put in a safe place, where he could sleep off the effects of
alcohol. The officer told Elise, "we could do that."8 ' The next morning,
Clarence was dead. He had hung himself in his cell.
Elise filed a section 1983 lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina.82 She named as defendants
the city of Charlotte, various city employees, and employees of the
Mecklenburg County Jail. The defendants moved for summary judgment,
but the district court denied that motion. The defendants appealed to the
Fourth Circuit.
The court of appeals began its analysis of Gordon with a discussion
of Estelle v. Gamble,83 the United States Supreme Court decision that
73. Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295-96 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928
(1980).
74. Buffington v. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d 113, 120 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 1106 (1991); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (l1th Cir. 1990); Partridge v. Two
Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d
44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977).
75. Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1121 (4th Cir. 1981).
76. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986).
77. Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 1989).
78. Elliott v. Cheshire County, 940 F.2d 7, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1991).
79. 971 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1992).
80. Gordon v. Kidd, 971 F.2d 1087, 1090 (4th Cir. 1992).
81. Id.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides that a person who under color of state
law deprives another person of constitutional rights shall be liable for that deprivation. Id.
83. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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established the deliberate indifference standard. Under Estelle, prison
officials violate an inmate's civil rights by displaying deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs.84 Those needs can include a prisoner's psycho-
logical condition.15 In a jail-suicide case, deliberate indifference exists if
police officers, knowing a prisoner has threatened to commit suicide,
nevertheless place the prisoner in an unsupervised cell.1 6 Conversely, if
officers have no reason to suspect a prisoner is a suicide risk, deliberate
indifference does not exist merely because the prisoner kills himself. 7
Applying the Estelle standard to the Gordon facts, the Fourth Circuit
noted that the police officers who arrested Clarence reported his suicide
threat to another officer, C.G. Lyman. Lyman, in turn, took Clarence's
belt from him and warned the Mecklenburg County Jail's assistant super-
visor, Deputy John Smith, that Clarence might be suicidal. Based on these
efforts, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the arresting officers and Lyman
were not deliberately indifferent to Clarence's condition. The court reached
a different finding, however, with regard to Smith. The assistant jail
supervisor admitted that Lyman warned him that Clarence was a suicide
threat. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit determined that Smith's failure
to take any action in response to that information was sufficient reason
to deny him summary judgment. Conversely, three additional defendants-
two other deputies and the jail's night nurse-were unaware of Clarence's
suicide threats because Smith did not pass on that information. Thus, the
Fourth Circuit concluded, the district court improperly denied summary
judgment to all the defendants save Smith.
The Fourth Circuit's application of the deliberate indifference standard
in Gordon is in accord with jail-suicide cases from other circuits.8 For
example, in Hall v. Ryan,89 an inmate's guardian brought a section 1983
84. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
85. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1977).
86. Buffington v. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d 113, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1106 (1991).
87. Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 35 (4th Cir. 1990).
88. In addition to those cases cited in the text of this comment, see, e.g., Colburn v.
Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that deliberate indifference
exists if officials knew or should have known of inmate's particular vulnerability to suicide);
Buffington v. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d 113, 120 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that police who know
pretrial detainee is on verge of suicide have duty under due process clause to refrain from
deliberate indifference), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1106 (1991); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34-
35 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying deliberate indifference standard to pretrial detainee's suicide); Cabrales
v. County of L.A., 864 F.2d 1454, 1456-57 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming jury verdict finding
defendants deliberately indifferent with regard to prisoner who had previously attempted suicide),
vacated, 490 U.S. 1087, reinstated, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091
(1990); Freedman v. City of Allentown, 853 F.2d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that evidence
officials knew of prisoner's suicidal tendencies yet failed to take reasonable precautions will
preclude summary judgment); Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182, 1187
(5th Cir. 1986) (stating that failure to take steps to prevent suicidal detainee from harming
himself may violate due process).
89. 957 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1992).
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claim against the city of Decatur, Illinois, and five of its police officers. 9°
The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that they had not
acted with deliberate indifference.9' The United States District Court for
the Central District of Illinois denied summary judgment, 92 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 93 One police
officer testified that the inmate, Clifford Howard, Jr., threw his shoes
across the booking room, urinated on the floor, cursed at the officers,
and flushed the toilet in his cell repeatedly. 94- Based on this behavior, and
also on indications in Howard's arrest record that he had attempted suicide
before, the Seventh Circuit concluded that whether the defendants actually
knew Howard was a serious suicide risk was a question for a jury.9
Consequently, denying the defendants' summary judgment motion was
proper.
96
Similarly, in Elliott v. Cheshire County,97 a prisoner's father brought
a section 1983 action after the prisoner, Guy Elliott, Jr., committed suicide
in the county jail.9 Other inmates testified that Elliott had discussed
suicide, had banged his head against the bars of his cell, and had tried to
break his neck by jamming his head underneath a shelf.99 The inmates
said that they reported Elliott's erratic behavior to corrections officers.ee
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the
inmates' testimony created a jury issue.'0 ' If the inmates reported Elliott's
threats to jail officials, the First Circuit reasoned, the officers' possible
failure to assess Elliott's mental condition and to take steps to prevent a
suicide attempt may have constituted deliberate indifference. 0 2 Therefore,
the First Circuit vacated a decision by the United States District Court
for the District of New Hampshire granting summary judgment to the jail
officials.103
The Gordon decision also is consistent with jail-suicide cases in which
defendants prevailed on summary judgment.1 4 For example, in Edwards
90. Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 402-03 (7th Cir. 1992).
91. Id. at 404.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 403.
95. Id. at 405.
96. Id. at 404.
97. 940 F.2d 7 (Ist Cir. 1991).
98. Elliott v. Cheshire County, 940 F.2d 7, 8 (Ist Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 11.
102. Id. at 11-12.
103. Id.
104. In addition to those cases cited in the text of this comment, see Williams v. Borough
of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 466 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding 'that jail officials who did not
know inmate's history of suicide attempts were at most negligent, and not deliberately indifferent,
in failing to remove inmate's belt, which he later used to commit suicide); Estate of Cartwright
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v. Gilbert,0 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
found that the defendants, the jail officials, had no indication that the
inmate in question might commit suicide.1 6 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the trial court should have granted summary judgment to
those officials. 10 7 Likewise, in State Bank v. Camic'05 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that police officers did
not know, and did not have any reason to suspect, that a person they
arrested had suicidal tendencies. 09 Thus, as was the case for those Gordon
defendants who did not know of Clarence's suicidal threats, summary
judgment for the Camic defendants was appropriate." 0
Polsby v. Chase
970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992),
petition for cert. filed (Dec. 7, 1992)
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"' it is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to retaliate against an employee or
an applicant for employment because that employee or applicant files or
participates in the filing of a discrimination charge with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)." 2 The definition of an un-
lawful employment practice in Title VII encompasses those actions an
employer takes that are related to certain aspects of employment, such as
hiring and compensation." 3 Despite the plain language of the statute, there
is a split among the federal circuit courts on whether the "employee"
protected by Title VII includes the former employee of an employer."
4
v. City of Concord, 856 F.2d 1437, 1438 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming trial court's dismissal of
complaint against jail officials who, according to trial court, had no reason to believe inmate
was contemplating suicide).
105. 867 F.2d 1271 (11th Cir. 1989).
106. Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 1989). Although the plaintiff
introduced an expert's affidavit listing possible indications of inmates' suicidal tendencies in
general, there was no evidence that the defendants were aware of these possible indicators or
had any duty to be aware of them. Id.
107. Id. at 1277.
108. 712 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1983).
109. State Bank v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 995 (1983).
110. Id.
111. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 241, 253-55
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
114. See Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 493 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that Title VII does
not address claims of discrimination occurring subsequent to employment); Bailey v. USX Corp.,
850 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that former employees may sue for retaliation
against them under Title VII); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir.
1978) (holding that statute prohibits discrimination arising out of employment relationship whether
or not person discriminated against is employee at time of discriminatory event); Rutherford v.
American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1977) (same).
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In Polsby v. Chase,"5 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit addressed this specific issue. The court also considered
when the waiver and equitable tolling of a time limit barring a sexual
discrimination claim is appropriate under Title VII. Further, the court
reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
allow the plaintiff to amend her complaint to add a Racketeering, Influence
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) charge.
Plaintiff, M. Maureen Polsby, M.D., complained of numerous acts
of sexual discrimination by defendant Dr. Thomas Chase, Director of the
National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and
Stroke (NINCDS), while she was employed there from 1983 to 1985.
During her employment, Polsby consulted a person who she erroneously
thought was an EEOC counselor about this sexual discrimination. Other
persons Polsby consulted, including one attorney, incorrectly told her that
there was a six month statute of limitations on filing a discrimination
complaint.
Polsby left NINCDS on July 9, 1985, after Chase told her that
NINCDS would not renew her contract. She talked with an EEOC coun-
selor for the first time on December 13, 1985 and filed a formal complaint
with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in January
1986. In-March 1988, the HHS issued a Proposed Disposition, which later
became the Final Disposition of Polsby's complaint. The Proposed Dis-
position found that Polsby did not file her complaint within the requisite
thirty days of the alleged discriminatory event and that regardless of the
late filing, the evidence did not support Polsby's claim.
Meanwhile, in December 1985, Polsby requested a letter from NINCDS
describing her training there, to assist her in obtaining certification from
the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. Although NINCDS
sent the letter, it included statements that NINCDS would not grant Polsby
credit towards residency for her time spent at NINCDS. Despite her
requests, NINCDS refused to modify its position. Polsby claimed that the
defendants at NINCDS subsequently began to slander her professional
competency.
Upon Final Disposition, Polsby filed a pro se complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland, against various persons
at NINCDS and the HHS, alleging sexual discrimination under Title VII
and various common-law torts. She sought declaratory and injunctive
relief and money damages. The district court dismissed the common-law
claims and some of the defendants. HHS filed an answer, but raised no
affirmative defenses.
Polsby subsequently moved to amend her complaint to add RICO and
common-law tort claims and to join other defendants. Polsby asserted
that in December 1989 she discovered that the defendants at NINCDS had
115. 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Dec.
7, 1992) (No. 92-966).
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appropriated her research without her consent and used it in a published
scientific article, which damaged her reputation by use of fabricated data.
The district court denied her motion, finding that the new claims were
merely restatements of her original complaint.
HHS moved for summary judgment in July 1992 on the grounds that
Polsby's claim was time barred and that she could not make out a prima
facie case for retaliation under Title VII. The district court granted the
motion on the first ground without commenting on the second. Polsby
subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit, raising three issues: 1) whether
the time limits barred her claim of sexual discrimination; 2) whether she
made out a prima facie case for retaliation; and 3) whether the court
abused its discretion when it denied her motion to amend her complaint
to add a RICO claim.
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the time limit issue. There was no
dispute that Polsby had failed to bring her complaint of sexual discrimi-
nation within the time limits prescribed by regulation.11 6 As the time limit
was not a jurisdictional issue, the court turned to a consideration of
whether it should grant equitable relief to Polsby in light of her failure
to file a timely claim before the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The Fourth Circuit noted that it usually granted equitable relief when the
claimant was diligent in pursuit of judicial remedies and when the failure
to file timely was the result of either the deliberate design of the employer
or actions the employer should unmistakably have known would cause a
delay in filing. The court found that Polsby was not diligent in the filing
of her claim and that HHS did nothing to mislead her. The court denied
Polsby's plea for equitable relief from the time bar on the basis of that
finding. Further, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing HHS to amend its complaint to include
the time limit defense after the filing of its answer. Finally the court of
appeals held that a proper reading of Title 29 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, section 1613.214(a)(4)1 7 requires HHS to extend the time
limit for filing a claim only when the claimant shows that her employer
did not notify her of the time limits and that she did not know of them
otherwise. Because Polsby offered no proof that her employer failed to
post notice of the time limits, she did not meet the requirement of the
regulation.
116. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(1)(i) (1985). The EEOC may accept the complaint only if the
complainant brought to the attention of an EEOC Counselor the matter causing her to believe
she had been discriminated against within 30 days of the date of the alleged discriminatory event.
Id.
117. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(4) (1985). Section 1613.214(a)(4) reads in pertinent part:
The agency shall extend the time limits in this section: (i) When the complainant
shows that he was not notified of the time limits and was not otherwise aware of
them, or that he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control from submitting
the matter within the time limits; (ii) or for other reasons considered sufficient by the
agency.
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Proceeding to the second issue, the Fourth Circuit held that Title VII
provides no cause of action against a former employer by a former
employee for acts of retaliation after termination of employment. The
Fourth Circuit found u'npersuasive the reasoning of the majority of circuits,
which read former employees into the statute based on policy considera-
tions and perceived statutory purpose."' l The court instead chose to follow
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Reed v. Shepard. 19 Quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,
20
the court stated that the resolution of the meaning of a statute begins
with the language of the statute itself, and when its language is plain, the
sole function of the court is to enforce the statute according to its terms.' 2,
Looking at the language barring discriminatory practices found in Title
VII,- 2 the court noted no mention of former employees. Further, the
specific inclusion of "applicants for employment" in the language of the
statute, and the specific exclusion of former employees, is a clear expres-
sion of Congress's intent to exclude former employees from protection
under Title VII. The court of appeals also found that the type of discrim-
inatory practices which Title VII prohibits were those particularly related
to employment. 23 Thus, the court held, Title VII does not protect against
discriminatory practices after the termination of employment.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit looked at the remedies available for dis-
criminatory practices and noted that the statute provides for equitable but
not legal remedies.'2 The court found that the great difficulty in applying
equitable remedies to post-employment retaliation is a strong policy reason
why Title VII protections should not apply to former employees. The
118. See Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that court
should not apply plain meaning rule to produce result inconsistent with policies underlying
statute); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that giving
narrow construction to term "employee" would not give effect to statute's purpose, which is to
furnish remedy against employer's use of discrimination in conn ction with prospective, present,
or past employment relationship to cause harm); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce,
565 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1977) (finding that excluding former employee would result in
narrow interpretation of statute not justified by its legislative history).
119. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that under § 2000e-3(a) events subsequent to and
unrelated to employment do not evidence actionable retaliation).
120. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
121. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Section 2000e reads in pertinent part: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against one of his employees or applicants
for employment, ... because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." Id.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). Section 2000-2(a)(1) reads: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment.... ." Id.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Section 2000e-5(g) reads in pertinent part: "... the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate ... or any other equitable relief as the court
deems proper." Id.
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court determined that, given both the clear language of the statute and
the policy considerations, a claim of postemployment retaliatory acts is
not a cognizable claim under Title VII.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that Polsby's allegation of a RICO
claim lacked the required element of continuity to show a pattern of
racketeering activity. The court noted that two Fourth Circuit cases pre-
viously had held that the pattern requirement is necessary to prevent
someone from transforming a claim of ordinary fraud into a RICO
claim. 25 Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court correctly
refused Polsby's motion to amend her complaint to add a RICO claim.
The Fourth Circuit's holding excluding a former employee from pro-
tection under Title VII is contrary to a significant number of other circuit
decisions interpreting Title VII.126 It is also contrary to a number of court
of appeals decisions interpreting similar language in other federal sta-
tutes. 27 However, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation is consistent with the
statute's definition of the term "employee"' 2 8 and with the holding of
Whatley v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority that to prove a
prima facie case under Title VII a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, the
occurrence of an adverse employment action.1 29 The court of appeals'
exclusion of former employees is consonant with the remedies prescribed
by Title VII for retaliatory action. 30 The court's interpretation of Title
VII's protections is arguably consistent with the underlying purpose of the
125. See Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 685 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that if
"pattern requirement" has any force whatsoever, it is to prevent transformation of ordinary
commercial fraud into federal RICO claim); International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d
149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that to allow pattern of racketeering to flow from single,
limited scheme would undermine congressional intent).
126. See Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1531-32 (l1th Cir. 1990)
(holding that term "employee" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) includes former employee), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 353 (1990); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (lth Cir. 1988) (holding
that former employees may sue for retaliation against them under Title VII); Pantchenko v. C.B.
Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination
arising out of employment relationship whether or not person discriminated against is employee
at time of discriminatory event); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162,
1165 (10th Cir. 1977) (same).
127. See Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding
that term "employee" used in antiretaliation provision of Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1988), encompasses former employees); EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821
F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 147 (6th
Cir. 1977) (holding that term "employee" in antiretaliation provision of Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988) encompasses former employees).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988 & Supp. 11 1992). Section 2000e(f) reads in pertinent part:
"The term 'employee' means an individual employed by an employer.... ." Id.
129. 632 F.2d 1325, 1328 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (providing equitable and not legal
remedies); see also Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1536-42 (lth Cir. 1990)
(Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring) (arguing that presence of equitable remedies and lack of legal
remedies are indications of congressional intent to protect only employees and not former
employees).
